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Lotto Extra was offered as part of the United Kingdom National Lottery’s portfolio of games between
2000 and 2006. A demand model for the game is estimated and used to illustrate a discussion of why
sales of the game fell steadily to the point where it was no longer viable. Emphasis is placed on the
lack of minor prizes and the long sequences of weeks when no one won the jackpot (and only) prize.
INTRODUCTION
The United Kingdom National Lottery, operated by Camelot, began in
1994. Its history has followed a similar trajectory to that of lotteries
inaugurated in American states and other jurisdictions around the world in the
nineteen-eighties. It first offered only a Saturday lotto game but quite quickly
added a midweek draw and scratchcards. Subsequently, it has steadily
broadened the portfolio of on-line games to attempt to replace sales of the
main lotto draw, which have declined in the face of waning public interest.
Games introduced included Thunderball, Daily Play and Euromillions, all of
which remain on sale. However, two new products failed in the sense that they
have not survived in the portfolio. A discussion of the reasons for the quick
demise of the first of these, Easy Play, a lotto style game linked to football
results, was provided by Forrest (1999). Here, we consider the second, Lotto
Extra, which was launched in November, 2000 but withdrawn in July, 2006.
Lotto Extra had a familiar structure to the extent that there were
Wednesday and Saturday draws where players were invited to select 6
numbers from 49; if none was successful in matching all six balls selected at
random, the prize fund was ‘rolled over’, ie added to that for the next draw.
However, Lotto Extra possessed several distinctive features which make
analysis of its sales history potentially illuminating with respect to
understanding of the lottery market. First, it was a jackpot-only game; 45%
of sales revenue was paid into the prize fund and all of that was used for the
jackpot prize. Evidently, with no lower tier prizes, it was designed to appeal to
a niche market of those who had a very strong preference for skewness in
returns.
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Second, it could not be purchased as a stand-alone product but only
in conjunction with a ticket for the main Lotto draw: one Lotto Extra ticket
could be bought for each Lotto entry made in the same transaction. Third,
although the odds were the same as in Lotto, the lower level of sales achieved
meant that it was won extraordinarily infrequently. The extreme case was that,
in a period up to October, 2004, 104 consecutive Wednesday draws passed
without there being a winner.
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These features provide the opportunity to observe the behaviour
of consumers in situations seldom or never encountered in other lotteries. For
example, because therewere several long sequences of drawswithout awinner,
rollovers accumulated to the point where some draws offered a (very) good bet,
with the expected value of holding a one pound ticket rising to as high as £1.40.
The relatively low response of sales observed
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may illustrate just how few risk-
neutral agents populate the economy. Again, behaviour of sales in the face of
long periods without a winner is of interest in itself because it is conventional
wisdom in the lottery industry that, while a game should be hard enough to
generate occasional rollovers that boost public interest, it should not be too hard
because players lose heart if no one wins. Here, we can test for the latter effect
because there was no cap on the number of consecutive rollovers.
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Further, it is
possible to distinguish the effects of expected value and the number of weeks
without awinner. For example, during the two year periodwhen no onewon the
Wednesday prize, jackpot did not increasemonotonically because prize money
rolled over not to the following Wednesday but into the Saturday in between
when sometimes it was in fact paid out. Consequently, the size of jackpot and
the expected value of a ticket were only weakly correlated with the number of
weeks since the last winner (correlation coefficients for Wednesday and
Saturday each in the range 0.25 to 0.30).
Our main discussion of what can be learned from the experience of Lotto
Extra will be illustrated by the results of a demandmodel. In its construction, we
exploit salesdata fromthefirst to thepenultimatedraw.Weexclude fromour data
set information on the final play of the game when conditions might be expected
to have been untypical. In fact, what was offered on the close-down date, July 8,
2006, was essentially a different product: if the jackpot was not won, it was to be
shared amongst those with five of the six balls matched. In the event, seventeen
such ticket holders shared the last day prize money. It is of interest, and
suggestive, that this final play of the game enjoyed sharply raised ticket sales.
DEMAND MODEL
The sales data to be analysed are presented as Figure 1. Inspection of the
raw data suggests a strong downward trend in both Wednesday and Saturday
games, with substantial variation around the trend as rollovers have their
impact on perceived value for money. These features will be incorporated in
our econometric model.
Gulley and Scott (1993) provided a formal framework for those who have
analysed the market for lotto games in Britain and elsewhere.
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Their insight
was that the structure of a lotto style game, whereby if the jackpot is not won it
is carried forward to the next play, generates significant variation in value for
money across draws. A rollover adds ‘free’ money to the pot in the sense that
it is not provided by this week’s players who therefore purchase a product with
elevated expected value. From a measure of how strongly sales respond to
improved expected value it may be possible to infer whether improved pay-
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outs in regular draws would pay for themselves from increased revenue (ie it is
possible to estimate elasticity of demand with respect to effective price
5
) and
more general insights may be obtained from the results on control variables in
the model.
Applying the Gulley- Scott model to the Lotto Extra case, we estimate the
following sales equation for the Wednesday game
6
:
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q is the natural log of the number and pound value of sales. q
w(21)
to q
w(25)
are
lagged dependent variables, included to capture habit persistence, and Q
s
represents sales in the immediately preceding (Saturday) draw.
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Trend and its
square are often included in lotto demand equations to capture a tendency for
sales to rise at first after the inception of the game but then to turn down as
boredom and disillusion set in; but here TRENDwas insignificant in preliminary
estimation and use of its square alone better captured the (downward) trajectory
of sales. The variable, WKSSINCEWIN is the number of consecutive previous
Wednesdays that had produced no winner. PRICE is the ‘effective price’ of a
Lotto Extra ticket, defined as the expected loss from purchase. PRICELOTTO is
similarly defined for tickets in the same day’s main Lotto draw. By linking the
purchases of Lotto and Lotto Extra, Camelot hoped to minimise cannibalisation
of the older game but, in principle, the two could be complements or substitutes
(for example, if therewere a large jackpot in Lotto, Extra sales could rise because
more people would visit the sales booths but could fall because some regular
Extra players spent all their lottery budget on tickets for the main draw).
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PRICE is one minus the expected value (EV) of prize money for a single
ticket holder. It is measured for the points in time at which sales in each draw
closed, i.e. when the number of tickets sold had been determined. Expected
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FIGURE 1. Sales history of Lotto Extra.
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value varies with the level of sales because the latter influences the probability
that the prize money will be won at all. Adapting Cook and Clotfelter (1993),
PRICE was calculated as follows:
PRICE ¼ 12 EV ¼ 12 ð1=QÞðRþ jQþ BÞð12 e
2pQ
Þð2Þ
where Q is level of sales, R is amount rolled over into the prize pool from the
preceding draw, j is the proportion of sales revenue paid into the jackpot (here
the only) prize pool, B is bonus money added to the prize by the operator
9
and
p is the probability of a single entry matching all six numbers and therefore
winning. In the case of Lotto Extra, j was set at 0.45 throughout while p (given
the 6/49 game format) was close to 1 in 14 million.
In (2) thefirst part of the expression forEVrepresents the amount per ticket in
the jackpot poolwhile (1 2 e
2pQ
) represents the probability that the prizewill be
paidout (rather than rolledover to the benefit of future players).Given the level of
sales achieved for the game, theprobability of theprizebeingpaid outwas always
low; for example in the first draw only 1.09m tickets were sold whereas there are
13.98m combinations of six numbers from which to choose. This accounts for
very low expected value/ high price in some draws of Lotto Extra comparedwith
other lottery games.On theother hand, long sequenceswithout awinner led to the
prize accumulating to high levels and it was sometimes added to by the operator,
so that the game became a good bet, i.e price became negative. Thus the range of
price observed in our data set is much wider than for lottery games previously
studied in the literature (from 2 £0.36 toþ£0.93 on Wednesdays).
We hypothesise that the sales of Lotto Extra depended not only on own
price but also on the value for money available from the day’s main lotto
draw. PRICELOTTO was calculated similarly to that for Lotto Extra except
that account had to be taken of the existence of smaller prizes. The rules of the
game are that 45% of sales revenue, along with any rollover or ‘superdraw’
bonus, is paid into the prize fund. Fixed £10 prizes are given to ticket holders
who match exactly three of the six balls. What remains of the prize fund is
then divided, 52% to the (match-six) jackpot and 48% to be split in pre-
determined proportions between second- third- and fourth-tier winners.
10
Thus the formula for calculating price became:
PRICELOTTO ¼ 12 EV
¼ 12 ½10p
3
þ ð1=QÞð:52Qð:452 10p
3
Þ þ Rþ BÞ
 ð12 e
2pQ
Þ þ ð1=QÞð:48Qð:452 10p
3
ÞÞ	ð3Þ
where p
3
is the probability of matching exactly three numbers (approximately
1 in 57).
In light of this discussion, it is clear that ordinary least squares estimation of
our sales equation, (1), is inappropriate.PRICE is endogenous since it dependson
sales (and, further, players have to forecast it when deciding on level of purchase
as its exact value emerges only ex post). Gulley and Scott therefore proposed
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estimation by two stage least squares. ROLLOVER, the amount rolled over from
the previous draw provides a convenient instrument for PRICE. In the UK
environment, a potential additional instrument is the amount of money added to
the prize fund as part of a ‘superdraw’. However, while the decision to add a
bonus to the jackpotmight be treated as exogenous, its amount cannot be since in
practice the operator offered not a specific sum of money but rather a top-up to
allow the jackpot to reach some advertised guaranteed level. The amount of
bonus money therefore itself depended on sales. Instead of the amount of bonus
money, we use as instruments dummy variables to represent particular levels of
guarantee. These variables, guaranteeone and guaranteefour refer to occasions
when there were guaranteed jackpots of £1m and £4m respectively (the £1m
jackpotwas invariablyonofferwhenno rollovermoneyhadbeen carried forward
from the previous Saturday).
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LOTTOPRICE is also in principle endogenous since sales of Lotto Extra
could affect sales, and therefore the price, of Lotto. Instruments used are
amount rolled over from the previous lotto draw (LOTTOROLLOVER) and
dummy variables (lottoguaranteeten and lottoguaranteefifteen) to represent
superdraws when there was a guaranteed jackpot of £15m or £20m.
Our complete Wednesday model, to be estimated by two stage least
squares, was therefore:
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Stage 2
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where EXPPRICE and EXPPRICELOTTO are values predicted for each draw
from the results of the first stage equations.
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Specification of the Saturday model was similar. A smaller number of
lagged dependent variables was included following experimentation, lags of
orders four and five proving insignificant. The trend term was initially entered
in the form of a quadratic but the squared termwas dropped when insignificant.
The weeks since a Saturday winner proved to have an effect that was this time
captured by including both the number of Saturdays and the square of the
number of Saturdays that had passed without a pay out. Instruments were
adapted to take account of larger jackpot guarantees, compared with
Wednesdays. guaranteetwenty accounts for the single occasion when a £20m
guaranteed jackpot was advertised for Lotto Extra
12
while lottoguarantee-
fifteen and lottoguaranteeoverfifteen refer to Saturdays when the main Lotto
draw had a guaranteed jackpot of either £15m or over £15m (usually £20m).
Summary statistics of key variables, information on which was collected
from the archive of lottery statistics maintained at www.merseyworld.com,
are presented in Table 1.
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Results from estimation of the models are exhibited
as Tables 2 and 3. As in previous applications of the Gulley-Scott model, there
emerges a well-determined downward sloping demand curve and goodness of
fit is high. Fortunately, one qualification to the Gulley-Scott model does not
apply here. When used to analyse conventional lotto games, the coefficient on
PRICE in the model is used to measure players’ response to improvements in
expected value whereas rollovers actually change both expected value and
prize structure (in that rollover money influences only the jackpot component
of expected value). In Lotto Extra, prize structure was constant since there
were no smaller prizes.
Interpretation of the results from our modelling exercise is incorporated in
our reflections on what can be learned from the history of this now defunct
lottery product.
TABLE 1
SUMMARY STATISTICS
Variable observations mean standard dev. minimum maximum
Wednesday
Lotto Extra sales (m.) 287 0.695 0.266 0.310 2.055
Lotto Extra ‘price’ 287 0.611 0.250 20.360 0.931
Lotto ‘price’ 295 0.549 0.080 0.165 0.589
Lotto Extra jackpot (£m.) 295 5.466 3.688 1.000 20.102
Weeks with no winner 295 28.708 26.809 0 104
Saturday
Lotto Extra Sales (m.) 290 0.967 0.422 0.413 3.577
Lotto Extra ‘price’ 290 0.604 0.255 20.395 0.932
Lotto ‘price’ 294 0.522 0.065 0.239 0.563
Lotto Extra jackpot (£m.) 294 5.694 3.806 1.000 21.118
Weeks with no winner 294 10.190 9.439 0 41
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REFLECTIONS
WHY THE GAME DIED
Any pari mutuel lottery game is a network good. The benefit of
participation depends on how many tickets are sold to other players since only
if the game is popular will an exciting jackpot be accumulated. This was
essentially the point underlying the concept of ‘the peculiar economies of
scale of lotto’ introduced to the literature by Cook and Clotfelter (1993).
TABLE 2
WEDNESDAY MODEL. ESTIMATION BY TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES
coefficient jtj
q
w(21)
.1230 3.86
q
w(22)
.1166 3.88
q
w(23)
.0680 2.19
q
w(24)
.0685 2.18
q
w(25)
.0809 2.92
Q
s
.1282 6.71
TREND
2
23.68E-06 12.67
WKSSINCEWIN 2 .0006 3.43
PRICE 2 .5481 25.12
LOTTOPRICE 2 .8672 17.93
Constant 8.076 19.71
R
2
(adj.) .974
N 243
Dependent variable: log of sales of Lotto Extra
TABLE 3
SATURDAY MODEL. ESTIMATION BY TWO STAGE LEAST SQUARES
coefficient jtj
q
s(21)
.2668 6.92
q
s(22)
.1018 2.89
q
s(23)
.1310 4.51
Q
w
.1455 4.19
TREND 2 .0015 13.79
WKSSINCEWIN .0036 2.26
WKSSINCEWIN
2
2 .00008 2.07
PRICE 2 .4425 17.18
PRICELOTTO 2 .8143 12.03
Constant 7.6443 17.67
R
2
(adj.) .973
N 267
Dependent variable: log of sales of Lotto Extra
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Given this distinctive characteristic of a lotto product, the long-run
prospects of a new game depend heavily on the level of sales in the first few
plays. Customers on launch have no record of previous sales to guide them in
the decision on how worthwhile the purchase might be (except to the extent
that the operator is likely to offer encouragement in the form of a guaranteed
jackpot for the first draw). If early sales in fact prove disappointing, some of
those who risked buying will conclude that they made a mistake and will
abandon the game. For those that remain, the product will now become less
attractive and further defections will occur. A vicious circle of falling sales
may then result until the game becomes non-sustainable.
This risk must have applied particularly strongly in the case of Lotto
Extra. It was targeted at an audience of unknown size that is so interested in
the possibility of a very large win that it is willing to forego the bait of smaller
prizes altogether. But if the market for such a product turns out to be very
limited, not enough prize money can be gathered in the pot to meet the
aspirations of this unusual subset of lottery players and the game will therefore
wither away.
This seems to be roughly what in fact happened to Lotto Extra. In the first
six weeks, notwithstanding that the prize pool rolled over after every single
draw, the declared jackpot on Saturday never reached the level of that of the
main Lotto game. Early indications were therefore that there were not enough
customers to create a network that was self sustaining in the sense that
collectively they could put enough in the pot to keep them all individually
interested in the product. In such a circumstance, a downward spiral in sales
was likely to be triggered and this is what is observed in the results of our
estimation. In contrast to most lotto games studied in the past, where trend is
positive in the early years before decline eventually sets in (Miers, 1996),
trend here is unrelentingly negative. For the Saturday game, the underlying
trend was for sales to fall at a constant proportionate rate and the Wednesday
data revealed an even more adverse situation, with sales declining at an
increasing proportionate rate over time.
14
SHORT-RUN PRICE ELASTICITY
To be sure, the long sequences of Lotto Extra rollovers produced some
attractive looking propositions. On nearly one third ofWednesdays and on one
quarter of Saturdays, the Extra game recorded both superior expected value
and a higher jackpot than Lotto itself. Draw to draw responsiveness of sales to
favourable movements in the mean and skewness of returns was, however,
limited and presumably reflected a failure to overcome the resistance of those
who give significant weight to variance in returns: this was always high in
Extra because of the lack of lesser prizes.
On the basis of our regression results, we calculated short-run own-price
elasticity of demand for Lotto Extra. Measured at the mean, it was 2 .34 on
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Wednesdays and 2 .27 for Saturdays, suggesting weak responsiveness to
value for money for a gaming product that offers no intermediate prizes.
Quiggin (1991) argued that a Friedman-Savage approach to explaining
participation in lottery games implies that operators should offer a single,
rather than a multiplicity of, prizes. The failure of Lotto Extra to capture a
significant part of the UK market suggests that expected utility theory fails to
account for the preferences of the bulk of lottery players who eschewed Lotto
Extra even when it appeared to offer good value.
LONG-RUN PRICE ELASTICITY
The traditional use to which results from the Gulley-Scott model are put is
to assess whether take-out from a game is consistent with net revenue (or
profit) maximisation. Whereas short-run elasticity measures responsiveness to
better value being offered for a single draw, long-run elasticity is the basis for
predicting how sales would change were the lottery to become ‘fairer’
permanently. It is calculated as short-run elasticity divided by one minus the
sum of the coefficients on the lagged dependent variables. Computed here at
sample means, the estimated values are 2 .62 and 2 .53 respectively, i.e.
demand appears to be inelastic with respect to effective price.
The implication is that Camelot would probably not have made the game
viable if it had responded to adverse sales by making it more generous to
players. On the other hand, while inelastic demand appears to imply that the
proportion of revenue used for prizes could safely have been reduced, this may
have damaged the reputation of a game the raison d’e
ˆ
tre of which was to
appeal to those who would dream of high jackpots.
CROSS-PRICE ELASTICITY
It is of interest whether Lotto Extra and Lotto were complements or
substitutes. When increased value for money was offered to Lotto players,
more tickets would be sold and thus there would be more transactions with the
option to purchase the add-on Extra product. On the other hand, participants
who might normally have purchased one of each could have decided to take
two Lotto tickets instead. In fact the former effect dominated since the
coefficients on PRICELOTTO in the Lotto Extra demand equations were
negative and highly significant. Computed at the means, point estimates of
short-run cross-price elasticity were 2 .41 (Wednesday) and 2 .42
(Saturday). Lotto Extra was much the smaller game, over the period attracting
only 3.0% of Wednesday, and 2.3% of Saturday, Lotto sales. As such, it
benefited off the back of the big game. The result echoes that of Matheson and
Grote (2006) who found positive effects on sales of local state games when the
multi-state Powerball offered large jackpots.
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WHEN NO ONE WINS
Much attention in the literature on lottery markets focuses on the
rationality or otherwise of participants. On the one hand, the Gulley-Scott
model invariably yields well defined demand curves, implying that players
actively consider value for money when taking decisions, just as with other
goods. On the other hand, Guryan and Kearney (2005) document large and
long lasting positive effects on sales at stores that sell a jackpot winning ticket
even though, objectively, the value of a ticket purchased there has not
changed.
Guryan and Kearney place their findings in the context of a literature in
psychology and economics that investigates misperceptions of randomness.
Our results contribute to the debate by showing an effect, even controlling for
expected value (and therefore jackpot, since this is the only source of expected
value here), from the number of times the game has been played without
producing a winner.
If players take time-consistent decisions based on objective criteria, our
variable WKSSINCEWIN would be insignificant since the objective odds of
winning are unchanged from draw to draw. However, there may be a
proportion of players who base their assessment on a mistaken attachment to
the gambler’s fallacy, reasoning that if there was a winner last week, it’s less
likely that there will be a winner this week; but, if it’s been a while since the
jackpot prize was awarded, it must happen soon. The presence of such
mythology in the population would lead to a positive coefficient on
WKSSINCEWIN. However, an opposite emotion may also have an effect:
being told draw after draw that no one has won might remind players of how
long the odds are in the game and undermine the dream that they might attain
fabulous wealth if only they purchased a ticket.
WKSSINCEWIN proved significant in both the Wednesday and Saturday
models. But results were not the same in each case. Lower sales on
Wednesdays implied very high probabilities of a rollover compared with any
other lottery game, and indeed only nine draws out of 295 produced a winner.
Long sequences with no money paid out proved very corrosive of support,
adding to the underlying downward trend in sales, as illustrated by the strength
of the estimated coefficient on WKSSINCEWIN.
For Saturdays, the game was more readily won because the market was
bigger. A winner was produced on 26 occasions in 294 draws. The pattern
captured by our results was that interest picked up as time without a winner
passed, up to about week 22, but declined thereafter (42 weeks was the longest
gap between Saturday wins). It is tempting to link the first, positive phase to
the ‘lottomania’ claimed by Beenstock and Haitovsky (2001) to be observed
in Israel where they found that sales following the third rollover of the lotto
game tended to reach levels that could not be explained by the size of jackpot.
However, caution should be exercised since explanations other than emotional
frenzy may account for their results. In contrast to Lotto Extra, the number of
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rollovers in the Israeli game was capped at three and the authors’ findings may
reflect a form of rational intertemporal substitution whereby some players
postpone participation until the fourth draw when all prize money is sure to be
paid out. But the spirit of our results accords with the overall tone of
Beenstock and Haitovsky’s paper which is that emotion may partly drive lotto
sales and there is scope for insights from psychology to supplement an
expected utility approach to understanding the lottery market. But, in any
case, our results underline that the emphasis of Clotfelter and Cook (1993) in
advising lottery agencies to select game format to ensure reasonable
frequency of winners was well taken. While the standard demand modelling
approach we have followed here has expected value as a key driver of
consumer take-up, facets of game design are also important. It is unlikely that
Lotto Extra will serve as a template for those in the future who will seek new
avenues for widening operators’ portfolios of on-line games.
NOTES
1. By contrast, over one-third of the Lotto prize fund is used on prizes of ten pounds awarded for matching
three of the six balls drawn and there are three intermediate tiers below the jackpot.
2. The draw in question was in August, 2004 and offered a jackpot in excess of £21m. The high expected
value was associated with sales of 2.26m. Regular Saturday main Lotto draws offer very negative
expected returns, yet sales are in the tens of millions.
3. Other lotteries impose such a cap whereby, if there is no jackpot winner after n draws, the jackpot pool
is then shared by those matching a lower number of balls in that nth draw. In Lotto, the cap is three, and
in Euromillions twelve, draws.
4. See Forrest (2003) for a survey of the literature.
5. Effective price is the nominal price of the ticket (usually one unit of local currency) minus the expected
value of prizes for the holder of a ticket.
6. Early applications of Gulley and Scott pooled sales data frommidweek and weekend draws, accounting
for the lower popularity of the midweek draw by the inclusion of a ‘Wednesday dummy’. However, this
imposes the implausible constraint, rejected in formal tests, that quantity responds to changes in any
exogenous variable, such as expected value, identically as between Wednesday and Saturday.
Therefore, current practice is to present separate estimates of Wednesday and Saturday demand and
this is followed here.
7. We experimented with different numbers of lags for both the dependent variable and previous Saturday
sales. Higher orders of lags than those included here were insignificant.
8. Semi-log was selected in preference to a linear functional form on standard goodness of fit criteria. The
choice of functional form is more clear cut than in the case of modelling of lotto because long
sequences of rollovers generate a variety of levels of rollover. In standard lotto games, such as UK
Lotto, there are only single and double rollovers, creating clusters of observations around three levels
of effective price, corresponding to regular, single rollover and double rollover draws.
9. A distinctive feature of the UK lottery is that the operator is permitted to use funds accumulated from
earlier regular draws to boost prize money for promotional ‘superdraws’.
10. These tiers correspond to matching five balls plus a bonus ball, five balls and four balls respectively. In
the unlikely event of there being no second (third) tier winner, the money cascades down to the tier
below. The lesser prize money will therefore always be paid out so long as someone matches four balls,
which is virtually certain at plausible sales levels.
11. These special draws involved over £0.5m and £3.5m respectively being added to the jackpot once sales
were known and therefore had a large influence on PRICE. There was a short period when other
guarantees were advertised but required only very small amounts of bonus ex post and these are ignored
in our Stage 1 specification.
12. This was on May 12, 2001. Sales reached a record 3.58m. With £14m. already rolled in to the prize
fund, the final cost to the operator in terms of superdrawmoney used up was £4.3m. because there was a
pay out that day.
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13. We sought to analyse data from 295 Wednesdays and 294 Saturdays but sales data were missing for a
small number of dates when the £1m. guarantee applied. The presence of lagged terms further reduced
sample size in estimation.
14. Though speculatively, one might also link the extremely adverse results on trend to the fact that running
a game without minor prizes builds up a group of customers who “nearly” matched six balls and
experience regret that they didn’t enter their numbers in another lottery game instead. Lotto provides a
prize for matching as few as three balls.
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